Bill Sykes' - In Retrospect
XXI.
(January 2010)
Bill
Sykes looks back in retrospect at material which has
been published in previous editions of "View from
America", in an attempt to determine whether the
subject matter written then is still applicable in
today’s world.
Article #21D.
The Next Surge: "Counter-bureaucracy". (Quoted verbatim).
Source New York Times, dated 8th of December 2009, (Unclassified)
Military life as seen by an American Officer who recently served in Afghanistan.
By Jonathan J. Vaccaro. (*)
The Taliban commander was back in the village. Our base roared to life as we prepared to capture him. Two Chinook helicopters spun their blades in anticipation in the dark. Fifty Afghan commandos brooded outside, pacing in the gravel. I was nearby, yelling into a phone: "Who else do we need approvals from? Another colonel? Why?"
A villager had come in that afternoon to tell us that a Taliban commander known for his deployment of suicide bombers was threatening the elders. The villager had come to my unit, a detachment of the United
States Army stationed in eastern Afghanistan, for help.
Mindful of orders to protect the civilian population, we developed a plan with the Afghan commandos to arrest the Taliban commander that evening before he moved back into Pakistan. While the troops prepared, I spent hours on the phone trying to convince the 11 separate Afghan,
American and international forces authorities who needed to sign off to agree on a plan.
Some couldn't be found. Some liked the idea, others suggested revisions. The plan evolved. Hours passed. The cell phone in the corner rang. "Where are you?" the villager asked urgently. The Taliban commander was drinking tea, he said.
At 5 a.m. the Afghan commandos gave up on us and went home. The helicopters powered down. The sun rose. I was still on the phone trying to arrange approvals. Intelligence arrived indicating that the Taliban
commander had moved on. The villagers were incredulous.
This incident is typical of what I saw during my six-month tour in Afghanistan this year. We were paralyzed by red tape, beaten by our own team. Our answer to Afghans seeking help was: "I can't come today or tomorrow, but maybe next week. I have several bosses that I need to ask for permission."
The decision has been made to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, and Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, is expected to speak to Congress this week about his strategy for the war.
Our troops can win the war, but they will be more effective if the bureaucracy is thinned.
In my experience, decisions move through the process of risk mitigation like molasses. When the Taliban arrive in a village, I discovered, it takes 96 hours for an Army commander to obtain necessary approvals to
act. In the first half of 2009, the Army Special Forces company I was with repeatedly tried to interdict Taliban. By our informal count, however, we (and the Afghan commandos we worked with) were stopped on 70 percent of our attempts because we could not achieve the requisite 11 approvals in time.
For some units, ground movement to dislodge the Taliban requires a colonel's oversight. In eastern Afghanistan, traveling in anything other than a 20-ton mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle requires a written justification, a risk assessment and approval from a colonel, a lieutenant colonel and sometimes a major. These vehicles are so large that they can drive to fewer than half the villages in Afghanistan. They
sink into wet roads, crush dry ones and require wide berth on mountain roads intended for donkeys.
The Taliban walk to these villages or drive pickup trucks.
The red tape isn't just on the battlefield. Combat commanders are required to submit reports in PowerPoint with proper fonts, line widths and colors so that the filing system is not derailed.
Small aid projects lag because of multi-month authorization procedures. A United States-financed health clinic in Khost Province was built last year, but its opening was delayed for more than eight months while paperwork for erecting its protective fence waited in the approval queue.
Communication with the population also undergoes thorough oversight.
When a suicide bomber detonates, the Afghan streets are abuzz with Taliban propaganda about the glories of the war against America.
Meanwhile, our messages have to inch through a press release approval pipeline, emerging 24 to 48 hours after the event, like a debutante too late for the ball.
Curbing the bureaucracy is possible. Decision-making authority for operations could be returned to battalions and brigades. Staffs that manage the flow of operations could operate on 24-hour schedules like
the forces they regulate. Authority to release information could be delegated to units in contact with Afghans. Formatting requirements could be eased. The culture of risk mitigation could be countered with a culture of initiative.
Mid-level leaders win or lose conflicts. Our forces are better than the Taliban's, but we have leashed them so tightly that they are unable to compete.
(*)Apparently Jonathan J. Vaccaro served as an officer with the United States Army in Afghanistan from January 2009 to July 2009.
My Comment:
Thank you Jonathon J. Vaccaro.
No wonder with all the bureaucracy which you have stated occurs in the American military decision making process, there is no wonder that we are not making any headway in the two Middle East wars.
Disclaimer:
Some of the information gathered for this news letter has been gleaned from American and international media sources, (including the internet), and as such is quoted as accurately as possible.
I try to obtain confirmation on each subject from several outlets, so the text is a mixture of composite items and personal comments and therefore the reader must make his/her own judgment as to the reliability and degree of accuracy of the subjects discussed.
Eric (Bill) Sykes, (Southern California).
January 2010.
We welcome feedback about any of the contents
of these newsletters. Please send all correspondence to bill_sykes@huddersfield1.co.uk
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